Wednesday, March 6, 2019

India and China in UNPKOs


Source: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/factcard_1.jpg


BREAKDOWN




India and UNPKOs

Korean War (November 1950 – July 1954): India deployed the 60th Indian Field Ambulance, a parachute-trained medical unit comprising 17 officers, nine junior commissioned officers (JCO) and 300 jawans in the Korean War. The unit was awarded the President's Trophy on 10 March 1955 by the then president of India Dr Rajendra Prasad. This is the only mission to be awarded the President's Trophy till date.

Indo-China (1954 – 1970): India deployed an infantry battalion and supporting staff during the crisis in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The mission included monitoring, ceasefire and repatriation of prisoners of war. As many as 970 officers, 140 JCOs, and 6,157 jawans were deployed.

Source: https://www.thequint.com/videos/news-videos/un-peacekeeping-missions-india-the-largest-contributor

More than 200,000 Indians have served in 49 of the 71 peacekeeping missions established around the world since 1948. Currently, there are around 6,700 uniformed peacekeepers from India, the vast majority of them in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in South Sudan.

India has also provided 15 Force Commanders to various missions, and was the first country to contribute to the Trust Fund on sexual exploitation and abuse, which was set up in 2016.

India’s longstanding service has not come without cost; as of 30 June 2018, over 160 Indian peacekeepers have paid the ultimate price while serving with the United Nations.   

From 2007-2016, there were nine rotations of all-female police units from India, whose primary responsibilities were to provide 24-hour guard duty, public order management and conduct night patrols in and around the capital, Monrovia, while assisting to build the capacity of local security institutions.







Source: https://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/02370/Yemen_suhasini__3__2370039a.jpg and https://www.thehindu.com/specials/the-great-yemen-escape-operation-rahat-by-numbers/article7089422.ece




Source: http://cimsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/yemen_cig_pgn_cimsec-17apr15.png and https://cimsec.org/the-roles-of-navies-in-the-yemeni-conflict/15901


CHINA IN UNPKOs





Source: He Y. (2019) China Rising and Its Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping. In: de Coning C., Peter M. (eds) United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

China also attaches great importance to peacekeeping personnel training. It has invested heavily in setting up peacekeeping training facilities and uses them, among other things, as institutions for relevant international cooperation. China established China Peacekeeping Police Training Center in 2000 and the Ministry of Defense Peacekeeping Center in 2009. Both training centres have advanced facilities, which showcases China’s increased material capabilities as well as strong political will of participating in UN peacekeeping.


Most signifcantly, on 28 September 2015, in his statement at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly and remarks at the UN Peacekeeping Summit, Chinese president Xi Jinping (2015a, b) announced six important commitments to support the improvement and strengthening of UN peacekeeping:


First, China will join the new UN peacekeeping Capability Readiness System and set up a permanent peacekeeping police squad and build a peacekeeping standby force of 8000 troops. Second, China will give favorable consideration to UN requests for more Chinese engineering soldiers and transportation and medical staff to take part in UN PKOs. Third, in the coming five years, China will train 2000 peacekeepers from other countries, and carry out 10 demining assistance programs which will include training and equipment provision. Fourth, in the coming five years, China will provide free military aid of US$100 million to the African Union to support the building of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis. Fifth, China will send the first peacekeeping helicopter squad to UN PKOs in Africa. Sixth, China will establish a 10-year, US$1 billion China-UN peace and development fund to support the UN’s work, advance multilateral cooperation and contribute more to world peace and development. Part of the fund will be used to support UN PKOs.

When use of force is necessary, Beijing insists that use of force should meet two basic requirements: “one is the authorization of the UNSC, the other for the purpose of self-defense or defense of the mandate” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).

In recent years, the Chinese academic community is becoming increasingly interested in discussing R2P. In 2012, Ruan Zongze, a senior researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a top Chinese think tank affliated to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), coined the concept of responsible protection (RP) vis-á-
vis R2P (Ruan 2012a). RP has six elements:
1. Any intervention should protect innocent civilians in the country concerned as well as regional peace and stability, rather than specifc political factions or armed forces;
2. The UN Security Council is the only body with the legitimacy to implement “humanitarian intervention”;
3. The necessary precondition for the implementation of force must be that all diplomatic and political means of settlement have been exhausted;
4. The goal of protection should be to prevent or alleviate a humanitarian disaster, rather than the overthrow of a government;
5. National reconstruction after intervention and protection should be given sustained support;

6. The UN should establish a monitoring mechanism, and an effective evaluation and accountability system (Ruan 2012b).

A look at the instances when China has vetoed resolutions in the UNSC shows that it has consistently objected to humanitarian intervention in Syria and voted against such measures 6 times and has similarly objected to measures against Venezuela in February 2019. Details can be found here: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick




Monday, March 4, 2019

Law of the Sea

In the context of the Law of the Sea, India and China, as two large maritime powers play a significant role. Both these countries are part of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. As we can see from the figure below the rights of these coastal states are affected by the natural contours of the coastal regions and how they impact their rights on territorial sea, EEZ etc. 




While India has to deal with overlapping claims with Bangladesh and Myanmar, with whom we have good relations, on the Eastern Front, and Pakistan, on the Western Front, China finds itself enmeshed in the overlapping claims in the South China Sea, as we can see below.



https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/18105/production/_90356589_south_china_sea_spratlys.png


To learn more about what is at stake, see this story: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349


The LoS regime has emerged on the basis of recognition of the immense potential of the maritime domain, both in the immediate adjacent waters of a coastal state and also further away from the coast. A few principles that emerged were on how to deal with the seamass (land under water) which contains immense potential for the development and welfare of people; and also on how large portions of water cannot be subject to territorial control and are the common heritage of mankind. The potential for use of Continental Shelf is immense and countries have submitted claims on it and the status of these claims can be seen here: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.ht. It appears that these claims need to be expedited, but we can also assess that there are significant technological barriers to exploit the continental shelf and the delay is not so harmful.



India has shown a positive attitude to the arbitration when it settled the dispute with Bangladesh and also agreed to the Delimitation exercise with Myanmar, whereas China has not taken part in the PCA case brought by Philippines and is exercising its immense power to change the situation on the ground. The contentious location of these rocks and islands can throw challenges to freedom of navigation and other uses of the maritime domain.