India and China at Sea

INDIA AND CHINA AT SEA

Video on - India and China Compete For Influence in the South China Sea

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHLzCS-3Zxc September 2011, STRATFOR

Comparison of Indian and Chinese Port Capacities 

https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-cm/india-s-container-capacity-at-12-ports-is-less-than-1-4th-of-single-chinese-port-of-shanghai-assocham-117121400180_1.html 

Resources referred in the class on October 18

1. https://ncpor.res.in/pages/researchview/8
2. https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm
3. https://uploads.fas.org/2020/09/PACOM2020_NDU-WMD-Brief2020_Minihan070720.pdf
4. https://news.usni.org/2022/10/17/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-oct-17-2022

India and China and Nuclear Politics

India and China and Nuclear Politics

Major International Non-proliferation Regimes

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up in 1957

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (1970 entry into force [EIF])

1. The Zangger Committee (ZAC) established in 1971
2. Trigger list
3. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): established in 1974
4. to prevent the export and re-transfer of nuclear materials or technology for peaceful purposes from being misused, such as for nuclear weapon development
5. The Australia Group (AG) was established to prevent the direct or inadvertent proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) in 1985
6. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987, and currently has thirty four member countries. It focuses on controlling the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related technologies for systems capable of delivering WMDs.
7. The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Established in 1996, the WA aims to function “by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies”

      According to an early study by a Chinese scholar, China’s nuclear non-proliferation policy development experienced three distinct periods: 1) emphasis on the national right to develop nuclear weapons (1949-1959); 2) acceptance of the non-proliferation norm and independence from the international non-proliferation regime (1959-1984); and 3) gradual integration with the international community (from 1984 on) (Zhu 1997: 44-48).

     
     J. MOHAN MALIK. China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 2000), pp. 445-478.

      In line with Sun Tzu's maxim of "subduing the enemy without fighting", China has played something of a double game in South Asia and Northeast Asia, having earlier contributed to their destabilization by transferring nuclear and missile technologies to its allies (Pakistan and North Korea) and later offering to help contain the problem of nuclear/missile proliferation in South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Such tactics buttress the point that China's "centrality" in regional security issues must be recognized as essential to their resolution. In other words, proliferation has afforded Beijing the unique opportunity to successfully play the dual role of a troublemaker and troubleshooter in South Asia and Northeast Asia. Such a strategy not only obviates the need for China to pose a direct threat to Japan or India but also allows Beijing to wield its prestige as a disinterested global nuclear power while playing the role of a regional arbiter.

      This ambivalence has been accompanied by deliberate attempts to exploit grey areas ("differences of interpretation" as in the MTCR case), ad hoc decision-making based on mixed or contradictory policy preferences, and poor export controls. The end result is that China remains a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.

      China's Nuclear Force Posture

      The Chinese have noted that both Russia and NATO have reaffirmed the centrality of nuclear weapons in their security strategies. As China becomes a full-fledged great power, it may conclude that substantial nuclear forces are a litmus test of great power status and mov improve both the quality and quantity of its nuclear arsenal. The changes are described as a shift in policy from "minimum deterrence" to "limited deterrence", that is, seeking a capability to deter conventional, theatre, and strategic nuclear war, and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a "limited deterrence" doctrine, China would need to acquire a counterforce capability in addition to a countervalue posture, which would require increased accuracy and expanded deploy.

      INDIA's STANCE
      Jaswant Singh. 1998. Against Nuclear Apartheid. Foreign Affairs. 77(5): 41- 52.

      Against Nuclear apartheid - status quo for P5 countries only. All related measures are aimed at retaining status quo
      
       India engages
       
      "In the absence of universal disarmament, India could scarcely accept a regime that arbitrarily divided nuclear haves from have-nots. India has always insisted that all nations' security interests are equal and legitimate. From the start, therefore, its principles instilled a distaste for the self-identified and closed club of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council."

      "India was the first to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954, for a nondiscriminatory treaty on nonproliferation in 1965, for a treaty on nonuse of nuclear weapons in 1978, for a nuclear freeze in 1982, and for a phased program for complete elimination of nuclear weapons in 1988."

      Overt and covert stances on NWs have an impact on strategies of nuclear deterrence.
      
      "Nuclear technologies became, at worst, commodities of international commerce and, at best, lubricants of diplomatic fidelity. "

     "India's motive remains security, not, as some have speciously charged, domestic politics. Had the tests been motivated simply by electoral exigencies, there would have been no need to test the range of technologies and yields demonstrated in May. In the marketplace ofIndian public life, a simple low-yield device would have sufficed. Since that marketplace did not govern the decision to experiment, the tests encompassed the range of technologies necessary to make a credible nuclear deterrent."
      
      The above analysis by Jaswant Singh captures a key insight on how foreign policy decisions have a limited impact on domestic politics. One wonders if the current Prime Minister knows or read about this insight before going on air and announcing the ASAT tests in March 2019, in the run up to elections.

     "India's approach in these negotiations will be to ensure that this treaty is universal, nondiscriminatory, and backed by an effective verification mechanism. "

     T.V. Paul (1998) The systemic bases of India's challenge to the global nuclear order, The Nonproliferation Review, 6:1, 1-11, DOI: 10.1080/10736709808436731

     “The NPT envisions no conditions under which rising powers could acquire nuclear weapons. The problem with this is that it reflects an underlying assumption that power relations in the international system will remain the same and no new great powers will arise.This assumption runs contrary to the rise and fall of great powers and power transitions among them evident in the 500-year history of the modern international system.”

     “But unlike the past, when war was an acceptable method of statecraft, in the nuclear age, war has become an unacceptable means of system change. Economic coercion has become the preferred alternative.”

     Deba R. Mohanty. Assertive but Flexible : India’s Approach to Non-Proliferation and Export Control Regimes. NFG Policy Paper No. 2/2013

      "India must recognize that it needs to refine its position on export controls, at least on conventional arms and dual-use technologies, as a first step towards the possibility of its eventual integration into the global regimes. India needs to take two major steps that will bring mutual benefits: first, it must harmonize its domestic rules and regulations related to international export control rules, including agreements such as Wassenaar; and second, it must take a persuasive line in negotiations with exporting countries in order to emphasize that India is a preserver rather than a violator of international non-proliferation norms."

     

     The Relevant Non-Proliferation Regimes and Profiles of China and India

Regime / Year of     Establishment	Number of members/ parties	China	India
NPT, 1968	191	1992	NO
ZA/1971	39 States — Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America.      Permanent Observer: European Commission	Joined in 1997	NO
NSG/1974	48 supplier states: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. Permanent Observer: European Commission.	Joined in 2004	NO      On 31 January, China stated that India must sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty before China will allow India to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, halting further progress for India’s admittance to the group.      Source: https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-suppliers-group-nsg/
AG/1985      The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons.	43 parties, including the European Commission	NO	2018
MTCR/1987      The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.	35 countries that are members (Partners) of the MTCR: Argentina (1993); Australia (1990); Austria (1991); Belgium (1990); Brazil (1995); Bulgaria (2004); Canada (1987); Czech Republic (1998); Denmark (1990); Finland (1991); France (1987); Germany (1987); Greece 1992); Hungary (1993); Iceland (1993); India (2016); Ireland (1992); Italy (1987); Japan (1987); Luxemburg (1990); Netherlands (1990); New Zealand (1991); Norway (1990); Poland (1998); Portugal (1992); Republic of Korea (2001); Russian Federation (1995); South Africa (1995); Spain (1990); Sweden (1991); Switzerland (1992); Turkey (1997); Ukraine (1998); United Kingdom (1987); United States of America (1987).      The 337 IMS facilities are located all over the globe and use four distinct technologies to look for signs of nuclear explosions: Seismic: to detect shockwaves in the Earth.  The seismic network is comprised of 170 stations.  50 primary stations provide data continuously and 120 auxiliary stations provide data on demand. They register thousands of earthquakes and mine explosions every year. Hydroacoustic: to detect acoustic signals in the oceans. Eleven stations are sufficient to monitor the big oceans as sound travels very efficiently in water. Infrasound: to detect low-frequency sound waves in the air with a network of 60 stations. Radionuclide: to detect radionuclide particles and noble gas. 80 stations provide the “smoking gun” evidence that an explosion was nuclear. Half of these stations are equipped with radionuclide noble gas detection technology.  The radionuclide network is complemented by 16 laboratories for detailed analysis.	NO	2016
WA/1996      The Wassenaar Arrangement, formally established in July 1996, is a voluntary export control regime whose 42 members [1] exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Through such exchanges, Wassenaar aims to promote "greater responsibility" among its members in exports of weapons and dual-use goods and to prevent "destabilizing accumulations."	42 participating states in the Wassenaar Arrangement are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.	NO	2018
CTBT 1996	44 States,	Signed in 1996, but not ratified	NO
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005	115 parties	2005	2006